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ACCOUNTING FOR THE WHOLE: 
WHY PANTHEISM IS ON A METAPHYSICAL 
PAR WITH COMPLEX THEISM
Caleb Cohoe
Pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the unity of the 
cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts. I argue that complex the-
ists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes, face 
the same problems. Current proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism 
do not offer any greater unity or ontological independence than pantheism, 
since they are modeled on priority monism. I  then discuss whether the for-
mal distinction of John Duns Scotus offers a way forward for complex theists. 
I show that only those classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better 
off with respect to aseity and unity than pantheists. Only proponents of divine 
simplicity can fairly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.
1. Introduction: Aseity and Unity
What, if anything, does it take to account for what we see around us? 
Classical theists insist that only a transcendent entity can provide suffi-
cient metaphysical grounding for reality. To explain why things exist, we 
need to find a ground of being that is more fundamental than familiar 
material objects, such as humans and horses, or their material parts, such 
as atoms and subatomic particles. We even need to go beyond the uni-
verse as a whole. Pantheists, by contrast, think that the cosmos itself could 
be the ultimate being or at least the entity that grounds and explains the 
manifold appearances around us.1
applyparastyle "fig//caption/p[1]" parastyle "FigCapt"
applyparastyle "fig" parastyle "Figure"
1Pantheists can be counted as theists insofar as they believe in God (while identifying 
God and cosmos). Classical theists, as I use that term, are those who hold that there is a cause 
or ultimate being (i.e. God) which is metaphysically ultimate and which transcends the cos-
mos and cannot be identified with it. This paper focuses on the question of metaphysical or 
ontological ultimacy. This sort of ultimacy is related to but distinct from axiological ultimacy 
(being the best or most valuable) and soteriological ultimacy (being the source of salvation, 
meaning, and fulfillment). Some such as J. L. Schellenberg insist that an ultimate being must 
fulfill all these roles (The Will to Imagine). While I  am open to such a position, this paper 
does not assume anything about the axiological or soteriological status of the metaphysically 
ultimate being, since that lies outside its scope. It does not make claims about what sorts of 
axiological or soteriological ultimacy classical theism in particular requires.
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Classical theists typically employ some version of a cosmological argu-
ment to argue for an ultimate transcendent being. They maintain that an 
independent, necessarily existing divine being grounds and explains the 
universe in a way that the cosmos itself cannot.2 The universe and the 
things in it are too contingent to be the stopping points of metaphysical 
explanation. Only a transcendent God can meet the conditions of aseity 
and unity necessary to be ultimate. Of course, for this sort of argument to 
succeed, the transcendent being must not need metaphysical explanation 
in the way that ordinary concrete objects and the universe itself do. In this 
paper, I lay out the requirements that aseity and unity place on ultimacy. 
I then use these requirements to argue that only classical theists who affirm 
divine simplicity are better off with respect to aseity and unity than pan-
theists. If we endorse aseity and unity as constraints on ultimacy, we are 
pushed to acknowledge that the ultimate is entirely simple.3 Complex the-
ists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes, 
are on a metaphysical par with pantheists when it comes to the explana-
tory and ontological priority of their supposed ultimate being.4 Current 
proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism do not offer any greater 
unity or ontological independence than pantheism, since they are modeled 
on a priority monism that is congenial to pantheists. Thus pantheists offer 
a strong challenge to classical theists: either embrace divine simplicity or 
2Recent discussions of this sort of cosmological and foundational reasoning include Pruss, 
The Principle of Sufficient Reason; Pearce, “Foundational Grounding”; Almeida, Cosmological 
Arguments; Hamri, “On the Ultimate Ground of Being”; Bohn, “Divine Foundationalism.”
3There is a further issue here: are we entitled to assume that the simple divine being must 
be transcendent (i.e., entirely distinct from us and entities in the world), or does this require 
argument? There are versions of monism, such as Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, that affirm a 
strong version of ontological simplicity but also hold an identity between the ultimate simple 
divine being and other entities that might seem to be distinct, such as the individual soul. We 
see this in Adi Shankara’s insistence that the divine, simple, and immutable Ātman is one 
and the same within various seemingly distinct things (Vedãnta Explained, I.1.11), without 
change or loss of unity (II.2.35) and while also being the same as the individual soul (II.3.17). 
Cf. the relationship between the individual soul, the world soul, and Nous for Plotinus or 
issues about the One in Parmenides (e.g. Palmer, “Parmenides”). This issue would require 
another paper, so I will not address it here, though for an argument that the ultimate prin-
ciple cannot in any way enter into relations of composition with other things, see Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, Ia Q. 3 A. 8.
4It is important to note that many Christian theologians affirm absolute divine simplicity 
while also affirming the doctrine of the Trinity. Theologians in the early Christian, medieval, 
and modern eras usually worked to show how this doctrine is compatible with simplic-
ity, rather than opting for complex theism. For example, Augustine says (de Trin. VII 1.2) 
that God is “absolutely simple” (summe simplex), a view Thomas Aquinas strongly defends 
(e.g. Summa Theologiae Ia Q. 3 A. 2–8). The Westminster Confession holds that God is “with-
out parts” and “immutable” (ch. 2.1). Things are somewhat more complex for the Eastern 
fathers, but they definitely take themselves to be affirming divine simplicity, albeit perhaps 
with more qualifications, e.g., Basil of Caeserea, Against Eunomius, II 29. For more on these 
complications, see Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caeserea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation 
of Divine Simplicity, chapters 4, 6–7, and conclusion. Obviously, the doctrine that God is three 
persons raises issues for divine simplicity, but I will not be considering them in this paper.
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accept that pantheism and theism are on a metaphysical par when it comes 
to explanatory and ontological priority. Only proponents of divine simplic-
ity can properly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.
To evaluate whether the cosmos or some other non-transcendent entity can 
serve as an ultimate being instead of a transcendent divine being, we need to 
know more about the constraints on serving as a ground for being or being 
ultimate. Two constraints are central to this question: aseity and unity. Aseity 
(from the Latin a se “from itself”) means that something has being or exists in 
virtue of itself and not in virtue of some other, further being. An ultimate being 
or a ground of being cannot, by definition, be dependent on some other entity 
for its being. If supposed ultimate being A were ontologically dependent on B, 
A would not, after all, be the ground of being, since B is grounding its exist-
ence. B would also be more ultimate than A, precisely insofar as it grounds A.
The ultimate being must also have a sufficient degree of unity. An unre-
lated collection of ontologically separate things, C, D, E, could not be the 
ultimate being. A bundle or heap of properties is not a suitable candidate 
for the ultimate being because a heap or bundle needs some further expla-
nation for why its constituents are what they are.5 The bundle itself does not 
need to have the constituents or properties that it does. Instead there is an 
external explanation for what accounts for those constituents being pres-
ent in that way. For example, one bundle of sticks is composed of a certain 
number of sticks and has a certain shape because of the way the sticks were 
collected by an agent (say, for kindling) while a bunch of sticks on the sea-
shore have the number and arrangement that they do because of the inter-
action between the tide and the beach. In bundle cases, there is some further 
external thing beyond the bundle that accounts for the composition of the 
bundle, whether an agent or some sort of force. But any sort of ontological 
dependence or causal dependence on some further thing that united C, D, 
and E would mean that the supposed ultimate being was not ultimate. So 
the ultimate being can neither be a mere collection of things nor any sort of 
unified whole that depends on something external for its unity.
This means that on some metaphysical views there will be nothing that 
counts as an ultimate being. If the universe is a Humean collection of suc-
cessive beings with correlations between them but no deeper or ultimate 
explanation for the whole, then there will be nothing that counts as an ulti-
mate being. In a Humean universe, although there is nothing beyond the 
universe that causes or explains it, the universe itself does not count as an 
ultimate being because it lacks the sort of unity something needs to count 
as a substance or real being.6 The universe is just one thing after another; 
5I am holding fixed that all three constituents are necessary for the ultimate being. If one 
of them, C say, were the ground of everything else, then D and E would be otiose.
6I am thus taking the conditions for ontological ultimacy to be stronger than those for 
being ontologically fundamental. At least on some views, fundamentality can be relative. 
Even in a Humean universe, some entities (e.g., the elements of physics) might be more 
fundamental than others and thus they would be candidates for what “the fundamental enti-
ties” refer to in such a universe. By contrast, in a Humean universe, there is nothing unified 
and ontologically independent enough to meet the conditions for ultimacy.
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it is not some unified whole composed out of its parts. All the explanatory 
work is done by connections between individual things, not by the uni-
verse itself. Because of this, such a universe could not fulfill the role of an 
ultimate being. To be a candidate for an ultimate being, something must 
have sufficient unity as well as meet the aseity condition.
2. Metaphysical Issues for Pantheism
Can a pantheist cosmos satisfy aseity and unity? To answer this ques-
tion, we need to say more about what pantheism is. This is a challenging 
task, given the great variety of views that go under this name. Andrei 
Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa take a straightforward approach in their 
recent introduction to a collection of papers on pantheism and panenthe-
ism, defining pantheism as the view that “God is identical with the uni-
verse.”7 This approach makes it clear that pantheists deny transcendence: 
God or any part of God is not outside or distinct from the universe. But 
it leaves underspecified what view of God, if any, is required to count as 
a pantheist. Is taking the universe to be the ultimate substance enough to 
be a pantheist or must the universe also be seen as having various tradi-
tional divine attributes, such as goodness, knowledge, causal power, etc.? 
For the purposes of this paper, I will take pantheists to be committed to 
denying divine transcendence.8 I will also take them to be committed to 
thinking that the universe forms an ordered whole which counts as an 
ultimate being and satisfies aseity and unity.
What is required in order for the universe to do this? Here pantheists 
differ. Some take a more minimal approach. On such views, the cosmos 
forms an ordered whole that has priority over its parts, but it is not itself 
an entity with knowledge or moral goodness. It may contain order and 
mind because its parts are panpsychic or proto-conscious, not because the 
cosmos itself is a mind.9 On other versions of pantheism, the cosmos itself 
has a mind or a world-soul. 10 This divine force, which is itself good and 
rational, organizes and orders the whole universe. These two approaches 
have different strategies for establishing the unity and order of the cos-
mos. On the first type, order and mind arise from features present in the 
material parts themselves. On the second type, by contrast, there is a 
fundamentally intellectual or psychic principle involved in ordering the 
7Buckareff and Nagasawa, “Guest Editorial Preface,” 2.
8My article will leave aside panentheist views, according to which, as Buckareff and 
Nagasawa put it, “the universe is an aspect of God, where this may include taking the uni-
verse to constitute or bear some other relation besides identity to God” (“Guest Editorial 
Preface,” 2). If complex theism turns out to be on a par with pantheism then a fortiori it will 
be on a metaphysical par with panentheism.
9Goff, “Did the Universe Design Itself?” offers one defense of such a view.
10Proponents of such views include the Stoics, and their divine embodied Logos, but also 
eclectic thinkers influenced by both Stoics and Platonists, such as Marcus Terrentio Varro, 
who, according to Augustine, identified God with the soul of the cosmos (civ. Dei VII.6; cf. 
VII. 9–10, 29–30). A contemporary example of this sort of position is found in Leslie, “What 
God Might Be.”
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matter of the universe. I will return below to the metaphysical advantages 
and disadvantages of these two types, but for now, we can start with the 
challenges common to both types.
The complexity of the universe may seem, on its own, to rule out aseity 
and unity. Indeed, pantheism has been attacked by theists for being unable 
to meet these conditions. How could a being with manifold parts be the ulti-
mate being, the metaphysical first principle of reality? With respect to aseity, 
the cosmos seems ontologically dependent in several ways. To begin with, on 
some views, the identity of the universe depends on the identity of its parts. 
Without the particular features of the space-time continuum that obtain (e.g., 
without the particles or fields or whichever other entities constitute it), the 
cosmos would not be what it is. Even if, however, its identity is not contin-
gent on having the particular parts it does, it is still the case that the universe 
would not be what it is without some parts. Even if the parts that constitute 
it are changing, it is still always true that without any of these parts the uni-
verse itself would not be. In this way, it seems to be ontologically dependent 
on something outside itself. The being of the universe seems to be contingent 
either on its parts or on some external cause that explains its existence.
Serious worries also arise with respect to unity. If the ultimate being has 
parts, then we need an explanation for why the cosmos has these parts and 
is one unified entity (as opposed to something like a heap). This explana-
tion would seemingly have to come from something further, not from the 
cosmos or its parts. Many have doubted whether the cosmos is or could be 
an internally unified whole: it either lacks unity or is unified by something 
external to it. There are some metaphysical views, such as unrestricted 
composition, which would allow for all the things in the universe to com-
pose another further thing.11 However, many hold that stronger condi-
tions are required for metaphysical composition. Why think that all the 
entities in the universe compose a unified whole? Further, even if there is 
a sort of unity to the cosmos, it might not be the strong sort of substantial 
and formal unity. To be ultimate, the universe needs to be the sort of whole 
that can serve as the fundamental ground for all other beings.
3. Pantheist Responses
There are various pantheist responses to these worries. Jonathan Schaffer 
insists that “according to common sense, the cosmos is prior to its many 
proper parts” since the various possible divisions of the whole cosmos 
into parts seem arbitrary and non-fundamental, whereas the whole is not 
arbitrary.12 Schaffer offers additional metaphysical arguments in favor of 
11Proponents of unrestricted composition or universalism, the view that, for any objects, 
there is a single object that is composed of those objects, include Leśniewski, “Foundations 
of the General Theory of Sets”; Goodman and Quine, “Steps Towards a Constructive 
Nominalism”; Lewis, Parts of Classes; Rea, “In Defense of Mereological Universalism”; and 
Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 191–193.
12Schaffer, “Monism,” 49.
207ACCOUNTING FOR THE WHOLE
such a view. One of his key arguments is based on what he calls the asym-
metry of supervenience:
The asymmetry is that the proper parts must supervene on their whole, but 
the whole need not supervene on its proper parts. In other words, though 
emergence is metaphysically possible, submergence—the converse of emer-
gence—is metaphysically impossible.13
While facts about the parts sometimes fix facts about the whole (if the parts 
of the table are flammable, the whole table will be as well), strong emer-
gence, where the whole has properties that do not supervene on its parts, 
is widely taken to be possible (even by those who do not think it actually 
obtains). By contrast, if you hold the whole fixed, everything about its 
parts will be fixed as well. There can be no “submergent” properties, as 
Schaffer puts it, that are underivable from truths about the whole. Any 
candidate for such a property (Fness say) would be a property of a certain 
part, G. But G is, by definition, part of the whole, so that what the whole 
is involves having G as a part. But to be such a part, to be G, is to have 
this property of Fness, which means that Fness is included in the whole. 
Given this asymmetry of supervenience, a priority monism grounded in 
the whole has an advantage over part-first ontologies.
There are also various responses pantheists can make to account for the 
unity and contingency of the universe. Some pantheist views appeal to 
panpsychism to explain the fine-tuning, unity, and order of the universe.14 
Others suggest that the goodness of the cosmos might itself explain why 
the cosmos must be as it is.15 Some, such as Baruch Spinoza, claim that, in 
fact, everything that happens in the universe is necessary.16 Contingency 
is only apparent. These strategies have various advantages and disadvan-
tages and not all are mutually compatible. This paper cannot definitively 
evaluate the prospects for all of them. Instead, its goal is to compare the 
general pantheist metaphysical strategy with the strategies used by the-
ists. All these pantheist responses to worries about unity and aseity make 
use of the idea that a whole can be prior to its parts and ultimate even if 
it depends in some way on its parts. The cosmos may need its parts and 
their order to be what it is, but this does not undermine its status as the 
unified ultimate being.
How does this sort of response compare with the metaphysical strate-
gies used by theists? If pantheists” accounts are successfully developed, 
how will the pantheist cosmos fare on aseity and unity? Answering this 
depends on whether metaphysical alternatives fare better with respect to 
13Schaffer, “Monism,” 56.
14E.g., Goff, “Did the Universe Design Itself?”
15E.g., Leslie, “What God Might Be.”
16“In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the 
necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way” (Spinoza, Ethics 
Ip29); “things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than 
they have been produced” (Spinoza, Ethics, Ip33).
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aseity and unity. If alternative metaphysical views provide stronger can-
didates for a being with ultimate ontological and explanatory priority, 
then they possess an advantage over pantheism with respect to ultimacy. 
If, however, alternative metaphysical views on the ultimate face similar 
problems with aseity and unity, then pantheism is no worse off than its 
competitors in terms of these conditions.17
4. Simple Theism and Strong Aseity
Our goal is to examine how pantheism stands on these questions relative 
to theistic views. Here we need to bring in the distinction between simple 
theists, who hold that the ultimate principle is entirely simple, having no 
ontologically distinct parts or attributes, and complex theists, who deny 
this. While simple theists are better off with respect to aseity and unity 
than pantheists, complex theists face similar challenges.
Let us start with simple theism. This view endorses the following 
principle:
Absolute Ontological Independence: The ultimate being cannot, in any 
way, depend for its being on anything distinct from itself.
This principle is interpreted by the classical theist tradition as ruling 
out any internal parts or ontologically distinct properties in the ultimate 
being. Figures such as Plotinus, Augustine, Ibn-Sīnā [Avicenna], Anselm 
of Canterbury, Moses Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas use this idea 
of aseity to insist on absolute divine simplicity.18 Any distinct parts or 
properties would contribute to making the ultimate what it is, making 
the ultimate dependent in some way, and violating aseity.19 Further, since 
the ultimate being is entirely simple, no question of unity arises, since 
there are no distinct parts, properties, or attributes to unify. Simple theism 
entirely satisfies the conditions of aseity and unity.20
17For the purposes of this article, I am setting aside epistemic issues about how probable it is 
that we live in a pantheist cosmos as opposed to a created universe (or various other options). 
While these questions are vital for an overall evaluation of pantheism, theism, and naturalism, 
evaluating them would require careful consideration of a number of complex issues, from the 
evidence for panpsychism to the status of natural laws and the nature of modality. Instead of 
examining all these details, this article will look at the structure of the resulting worldviews. 
If the pantheist model can be successfully worked out, what status will the pantheist cosmos 
have with respect to aseity and unity when compared to the simple theist and complex theist?
18Plotinus, Enneads, V.4.1.5–15, VI.8, 8.14–16, 14.35–42, VI.9, 6.13–30; Augustine, De Trinitate, 
6.7.8; Ibn-Sīnā [Avicenna] Metaphysics, book I, chapter 7; Anselm, Proslogion, 18; Maimonides, 
Guide, ch. 50; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia 3.7. As noted above, for classical Christian think-
ers there are complications here related to the Trinity. However, it is important to note thinkers 
such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas insist that the Trinity does not compromise absolute 
simplicity and endorse full-fledged divine simplicity. As my focus is comparing the respective 
metaphysics of pantheism and theism, this paper sets aside these Christian theological issues.
19See Cohoe, “Why the One Cannot Have Parts” for further elaboration and discussion 
of this claim.
20For an overview of the traditional connection between simplicity and aseity see Brower, 
“Simplicity and Aseity.”
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In pagan, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian contexts, simple theism was the 
dominant view during classical antiquity and throughout the medieval 
period. However, many contemporary theists reject simplicity due to concerns 
about its coherence21 and what they take to be its theological implications.22 
For our purposes, we need only note that simple theism is in good shape with 
respect to the conditions of aseity and unity, as long as its coherence can be 
defended, something a number of recent thinkers have done ably.23
5. Complex Theism and Weak Aseity
This leaves complex theists, those who deny absolute simplicity. 
Proponents of this sort of view endorse the claim that there is an ultimate 
transcendent being, but also hold that this being has multiple, ontologi-
cally distinct parts or properties.24
As R. T. Mullins puts it, such theists
reject divine simplicity and opt for divine unity. God’s attributes are not 
identical to each other. Instead, God’s essential attributes are distinct and 
coextensive. God’s wisdom is not identical to His power, but one will not 
find God’s wisdom floating free from His power.25
How does complex theism fare with respect to aseity and unity?
Complex theists by and large recognize aseity and unity as conditions 
that the ultimate being needs to meet and seek to show that a complex 
divine being would meet these conditions. However, since they think 
that the divine being has parts or properties that are distinct from God, 
even if necessarily co-existent, they cannot endorse Absolute Ontological 
Independence. Instead, they must endorse a weaker version of aseity framed 
in terms of external dependence. Mullins, for example, insists that “the 
doctrine of divine aseity says that God’s existence and essential nature do 
not depend upon anything outside of God.”26 Things that are “completely 
distinct” from God must depend on God and God must not depend on 
anything that is “completely distinct” from God. We can formulate this 
weaker independence principle as follows:
Qualified Ontological Independence: The ultimate being cannot, in any 
way, depend for its being on anything completely distinct from itself.
21E.g., Plantinga, Does God have a Nature?; Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God.
22E.g., Mullins, “Simply Impossible.” For worries about coherence, see Plantinga, Does 
God have a Nature? and Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God; for worries about simplicity’s 
theological implications see Mullins, “Simply Impossible.”
23Defenses include Bergman and Brower, “A Theistic Argument Against Platonism”; 
Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity”; Stump, “The Nature of a Simple God”; Jacobs, 
“The Ineffable, Inconceivable, and Incomprehensible God”; Cohoe, “Why the One Cannot 
Have Parts”; Schärtl, “Divine Simplicity.”
24The claim that the ultimate being is transcendent and thus not the same as the universe 
is, of course, the key feature that separates complex theists from pantheists.
25Mullins, “The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism,” 331.
26Mullins, “Simply Impossible,” 192, italics added.
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This allows for God to have ontologically distinct parts while still preserv-
ing aseity. As long as everything outside of God depends on God and God 
depends on nothing outside God, aseity is satisfied, regardless of which 
ontological dependence relations obtain within the divine being.
We should be suspicious of this move. There are surely some internal 
ontological relations that would rule out aseity. If the divine being turned 
out to ontologically depend on the divine attributes while they did not 
depend on the divine being, this would certainly call the supposed aseity 
of the divine being into question.
Thomas Morris tries to motivate distinct conditions for ontological rela-
tions internal and external to God by suggesting that dependence rela-
tions involving God are different from those only involving creatures. He 
insists that the criteria for ontological dependence relations between cre-
ated objects are fundamentally different from those that obtain between 
God and created objects:
on any ontology in which everything distinct from God depends on him for 
its existence, composition and complexity relations into which God enters 
will be importantly different from composition and complexity relations 
holding among created objects. Asymmetrical ontological dependence rela-
tions obtaining among the latter will not hold in the same way among the 
former.27
So, everything distinct from God is asymmetrically ontologically depend-
ent on God, since each thing outside God relies on God for its being, but 
things might be different within God. Morris claims that even if:
there is any substantive sense in which God depends on his properties, it 
will also be true that his properties depend, and depend in a deeper onto-
logical sense, on him. Thus God will never be on the receiving end only, so 
to speak, of an ontological dependence relation.28
Morris thinks (contra Anselm, as he notes) that as long as the divine prop-
erties also depend on God, aseity is preserved and God will still count as an 
independent being, even if God depends on the divine attributes in some 
sense. Morris holds that aseity is satisfied as long as, for any candidate 
independent being I, there is no distinct being on which it depends and 
there is no being, property, or attribute on which I asymmetrically depends. 
Humans, horses, and hadrons are not independent beings because they 
asymmetrically depend on the distinct divine being. A  complex divine 
being, however, can be independent because such a being’s dependence 
on its parts is symmetric: parts and whole both depend on each other.
6. Pantheism Satisfies Weak Aseity
Now Anselm himself raises a challenge for Morris: a supposedly ultimate 
being with parts “is not fully one but is in some way many and different 
27Morris, “Dependence and Divine Simplicity,” 170.
28Morris, “Dependence and Divine Simplicity,” 171.
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from itself.”29 Such a being could not be ultimate because it “is able to be 
divided either actually or conceptually.”30 Since its parts are different from 
the whole, we can evaluate them separately insofar as they are distinct 
from each other, at least conceptually, and then either the whole or the 
parts must be lesser than the other. But this would mean that the ulti-
mate being either is or has parts than which something greater can be 
conceived, so it is not ultimate. We can conceive of a being that is entirely 
ultimate without any lesser parts and this being is greater than a being 
some of whose parts are not the greatest or best. Thus, even if this suppos-
edly ultimate being were in fact unable to be divided from its properties, 
the fact that it is conceptually divisible would still make it lesser than a 
being that is entirely one and indivisible. This pressures the complex the-
ists to either abandon perfect being theology or hold that simple theism 
turns out to be contradictory, too good to be true.
Even if, however, complex theists are successful in defending Qualified 
Ontological Independence as the appropriate standard, they will still be una-
ble to claim an advantage over other metaphysical views. What Morris 
says about God could be said just as easily about the cosmos by a pan-
theist. If the ultimate being is the cosmos itself, of which everything else 
is a part, then the cosmos counts as an a se being, since there is nothing 
completely distinct from it on which it depends (since everything that exists 
is part of it). Moreover, everything outside of it can be said to depend on it: 
a condition trivially satisfied, since there is nothing outside of it.
We can see this clearly in the characterization of aseity provided by 
Yann Schmitt:
(1′) Necessarily, for any x, if x is God, x creates and maintains in 
existence whatever is not identical with x or a part of x.31
Substituting in the Ultimate or the Cosmos for God illustrates how this 
condition is in danger of being trivially satisfied by pantheist views:
(1″) Necessarily, for any x, if x is the Ultimate/the Cosmos, x creates or 
maintains in existence whatever is not identical with x or a part of x.
If everything is either identical with or a part of the cosmos, then this 
condition seems to be met. There is nothing outside of the cosmos which 
the cosmos does not create or maintain, since on such metaphysical views 
there is nothing outside of it at all. The cosmos itself counts as a se.
7. Only Strong Aseity Can Distinguish Theism from Pantheism
This suggests there is a problem with only requiring an ultimate being to 
be independent from external entities: it allows for aseity to be trivially 
satisfied by claiming that everything is internal to the candidate entity. 
29“non est omnino unum, sed quodam modo plura et diversum a seipso” (Proslogion, 18).
30“vel actu vel intellectu dissolvi potest” (Proslogion, 18).
31Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” 125.
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This makes aseity too easy to meet. The obvious response is to extend 
the requirement of ontological independence to all entities and their inter-
nal parts. Once we do this, however, we are back to Absolute Ontological 
Independence, a condition neither a pantheistic universe nor a God with 
metaphysical parts can meet. Only the entirely simple being of classical 
theism would be a suitable candidate for the ultimate being.
Now we could add in a condition relating to the dependence of the 
parts on the whole:
(1‴) Necessarily, for any x, if x is the Ultimate/the Cosmos, x creates 
or maintains in existence whatever is not identical with x or a part of 
x and any part of x ontologically depends on x to be what it is.
This requires that candidates for ultimate being ground their parts. Their parts 
are what they are because of the whole. This move, however, is not one that 
will distinguish complex theism from pantheism. On both views, the ultimate 
being has parts or properties which it requires, even if these parts or properties 
are also ontologically dependent on the whole. Complex theists cannot require 
a stronger sort of dependence, such as creation, as God could not create God’s 
own parts without circular ontological dependence, as I will show below. The 
weaker version of dependence of parts on wholes is one that pantheists also 
affirm. So pantheists can maintain this weaker view of aseity just as much as 
complex theists. Either we endorse a strong version of aseity, which neither 
complex theism nor pantheism meets, or a weak version, which both meet.
8. The Unity of Complex Theism and the Unity of Pantheism
We see this result again when it comes to the question of unity. Is a complex 
divine being sufficiently unified to be a candidate for the ultimate being? 
Would such a being be more unified than the cosmos? For any strategy the 
complex theist adopts to explain the unity of God, the pantheist can adopt 
a parallel strategy for the unity of the cosmos.
We see this in Gregory Fowler’s recent defense of complex theism, 
based on the priority of the whole. The idea is that in certain unified struc-
ture the whole is explanatorily and ontologically prior to its parts. For 
example, the parts of the body have their status as parts because of the 
whole. Without the whole system in which they fit, the hand would not 
really be a hand nor the eye an eye. Gregory Fowler uses this notion to 
formulate a complex theism that he thinks can still respect the necessary 
metaphysical constraints. Fowler advocates for the following view:
The Doctrine of Divine Priority (DDP): For all x, if x is a proper part of God or 
x is a property of God, then x depends on God for its existence.32
Fowler presents this as an alternative to divine simplicity. If the whole can 
be ontologically prior to its parts, then theists can preserve aseity without 
endorsing absolute simplicity.
32Fowler, “Simplicity or Priority?”
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But if this is true for the theist, it is also true for the pantheist. On 
standard versions of pantheism, everything that exists is a part of the 
divine whole, meaning that this whole only has relations of ontological 
and explanatory dependence with its parts and not with anything exter-
nal.33 Indeed, Fowler specifically models his priority relation on Schaffer’s 
priority monism. Thus, a unified whole, such as the pantheist or prior-
ity monist cosmos, could have ontological priority over all of its parts in 
the same way that the complex theist’s divine being has priority over its 
parts. Both wholes can claim to make the parts what they are, while also 
depending on these parts for their continued persistence. The pantheist is 
no worse off than the complex theist when it comes to unity.
Another recent defense of complex theism also suggests that they are 
on a par. Matthew Baddorf claims that we can conceive of God’s rela-
tion to God’s properties as the relation which the bearer of tropes has to 
the tropes. While there are bidirectional counterfactual dependence rela-
tions between tropes and their bearers (if this trope did not exist, then 
this bearer would not exist and vice versa), the bearer is ontologically 
prior to the tropes themselves.34 This means that God must ground God’s 
tropes. To argue that God is more fundamental than God’s tropes, Baddorf 
makes a similar appeal to the priority of the whole, particularly the living 
whole over its parts, as defended by figures such as Aristotle, Hegel, and 
Schaffer.35 But again, this is exactly the sort of move that the pantheist can 
make just as well.
Pantheist attempts to make sense of the unity of the cosmos might also 
be relevant to complex theism. Bauer, for example, has argued for what he 
calls a Directed Unity view, on which the many causal powers in the uni-
verse are all interrelated and intentionally directed towards one another. 
For a power to be what it is, there needs to be other appropriate powers 
to which it can be related, acting and being acted upon, so that “all prop-
erties (powers) form an interconnected web, meaning that no property 
is causally isolated from the others.”36 Complex theists certainly should 
not want to hold that various divine powers or properties are unrelated 
to one another, so the idea of a web of powers with mutual entailments 
may be useful. On this view of powers holism, “the functions of all the 
powers in a system are ontologically interdependent. As such, the powers 
that make up the system are capable of affecting each other: when one 
undergoes a change, the system is appropriately affected.”37 This could 
help the complex theist address concerns about whether various divine 
powers are separable from one another and whether they are necessarily 
33See Schaffer, “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker” and “Monism.”
34Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity,” 407–409.
35Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity,” 412; cf. the Divine Truthmaker Complexity of Saenz, 
“Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.”
36Bauer, “Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity.”
37Bauer, “Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity.”
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coordinated. It would, however, again leave the complex theist using the 
same strategies as the pantheist.
We can say, then, that the most promising recent approaches for the 
complex theist to maintain the unity of the ultimate being are parallel to 
the pantheist’s. Such theists are in no better a position than pantheists. If 
the ultimate entity is a one-many—one substance with many ontologically 
distinct properties (tropes, modes, properties, etc.)—then a pantheistic 
universe can meet these requirements just as well. The distinct classical 
theistic move of insisting on a one beyond the many is lost. Only divine 
simplicity can claim such an ontological advantage over pantheistic rivals.
9. Complex Theism, Pantheism, and Necessity
Now you might object that, on complex theism, God is a necessary being, 
giving God a better claim than the cosmos for being ultimate. Here again, 
however, many versions of pantheism hold that the cosmos is necessary 
in some sense.38 Also, many of the conceptions of divine necessity put for-
ward by complex theists are vulnerable to parity challenges. For example, 
Thomas Morris insists that God, as the creator of everything creatable, cre-
ates God’s own haecceity or nature (making the nature causally depend-
ent on God) but also that God’s haecceity is logically sufficient for God’s 
existence (making God logically dependent on his nature). Morris recog-
nizes that this suggests that God is creating himself and attempts to avoid 
this by insisting that while each of these relations is always transitive, 
transitivity may not hold across both of them together.39 But this is highly 
implausible. A being whose nature is necessary cannot have parts that it 
creates, as then it would both depend on these parts (since they are nec-
essary and make it what it is) and these parts would depend on it (insofar 
as these parts are created). Morris’s proposal seems incoherent. Even if it 
were defensible, it would be vulnerable to parity arguments. If reciprocal 
ontological dependence is not circular and needs no further explanation 
or grounding, Morris’s view can be parodied by the pantheist or cosmic 
naturalist. The divine cosmos too could both make the parts that compose 
it while also depending on them.40 If Morris’s proposal were to turn out to 
be coherent, a self-making divine cosmos would be as well.
10. Can the Formal Distinction Distinguish Complex Theism from Pantheism?
There is one other recent approach in the literature that might be able to 
distinguish the unity and aseity of a complex and transcendent divine 
being from that of the cosmos. Yann Schmitt advocates for what he calls 
“absolute indivisibility,” adopting a version of the more moderate simplic-
ity advocated by John Duns Scotus. Scotus holds that the divine attributes 
38E.g. Spinoza Ethics, Ip29 and Ip33; Leslie, “What God Might Be.”
39Morris, Anselmian Explorations, 176.
40Especially on pantheist views on which there is a guiding mind or soul to do the making.
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are distinct from each another, but insists that they are so formally but 
not in reality. God and God’s attributes are ontologically inseparable. This 
requires employing the formal distinction of Duns Scotus, which has three 
conditions:
X is formally distinct from Y if and only if (1) X and Y are inseparable even 
for an omnipotent being, (2) X and Y do not have the same definition, (3) the 
distinction between X and Y exists de re.41
Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams describe the view of Scotus as unitive 
 containment. Scotus thinks that God and God’s attributes are formally 
 distinct, as this is necessary in order for there to be a union, but that 
they are also not distinct things in re. Scotus insists that this union is not 
a “composition or aggregation of distinct things” as such a composition 
would, he concedes, violate aseity and unity.42 Still, I agree with Steele and 
Williams that Scotus is, in fact, rejecting divine simplicity. As they note:
What Scotus calls simplicity involves mind-independent plurality—com-
plexity, even if not (on Scotus’s stipulative understanding of the word) com-
position—in God: precisely what his predecessors ruled out in the name of 
divine simplicity.43
Now, does the formal distinction give the complex theist a plausible 
account of the unity of God with God’s attributes that the pantheist 
cannot use?
The answer to this question depends, of course, on whether Scotus’s 
formal distinction is itself plausible.44 We need to accept that the formal 
distinction reflects a de re metaphysical distinction, even though X and 
Y are inseparable even for an omnipotent being. This raises a number of 
metaphysical issues. How do we assess and evaluate when a distinction 
between X and Y is de re, despite their inseparability? Which sorts of met-
aphysical views can affirm this sort of formal distinction?
For now, however, let us assume that we can accept Scotus’s formal 
distinction. The formal distinction, on its own, is not enough to vindicate 
the complex theist. The formal distinction has to apply to God and God’s 
attributes, while being too strict to apply to the cosmos and its parts. Are 
the divine attributes formally distinct but ontologically inseparable in a 
way that the attributes of the cosmos are not? If so, a complex divine being 
would be unified in a way that the cosmos cannot be allowing for a greater 
degree of simplicity and unity.
Now many of the features of the cosmos seem separable from one 
another by an omnipotent being, failing to meet condition (1) of the formal 
41Following the reformulation of Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine 
Simplicity,” 129.
42Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 74, trans. Steele and Williams. For discussion see Steele and 
Williams, “Complexity without Composition,” 622–625.
43Steele and Williams, “Complexity without Composition,” 631.
44As Steele and Williams note, “Complexity without Composition,” 630.
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distinction. Any version of pantheism that takes the cosmos to be com-
posed of multiple distinct substances could not use the formal distinc-
tion. However, there are ways pantheists could deny this. If one endorses 
Bauer’s version of powers holism, it is natural to think that powers are 
essentially individuated by the powers system they partly constitute. This 
could allow one to maintain that the cosmos, too, satisfies condition (1). 
This power is inseparable in being from what it is in this Directed Unity 
of powers that constitutes the cosmos. Since powers are essentially inter-
defined, they cannot be ontologically separated from their corresponding 
powers, even by an omnipotent being. The cosmos and its parts do meet 
conditions (2) and (3) about distinctness, so if condition (1) were met, the 
cosmos would be a candidate for unitive containment. This points to an 
area where more work is needed by advocates of pantheism. How distinct 
is the cosmos from its parts on their views?
There are also a number of issues that need to be resolved to show how the 
God of complex theism could satisfy these three conditions. First of all, the 
components of the formal distinction rule out many omni-being approaches 
which involve the best overall balance between various divine attributes. If 
maximum omnipotence is separable from maximum goodness (and possi-
bly incompossible with it), then such a being would not satisfy condition (1) 
of the formal distinction. Considerable work needs to be done to show which 
divine perfections (and which degrees—the maximal ones?) are absolutely 
inseparable, that is, inseparable even for an omnipotent being.45
Further, we would need distinct arguments for the inseparability of 
each and every divine attribute. Perfect being arguments that it would be 
better to have an attribute than not to have it would not be enough. Even 
if the best possible being would be both perfectly wise and perfectly lov-
ing this is not enough to show that “being perfectly wise” is logically and 
metaphysically inseparable from “being perfectly loving.” The approach 
of Scotus sets a very high bar to meet.
Finally, the formal distinction may just be too stringent for most com-
plex theists. It leaves us with a divine being all of whose attributes nec-
essarily imply the others, with no features that could be separated from 
the divine being in any possible world. Such restrictions seem incompat-
ible with many of the motivations that complex theists appeal to, such as 
allowing for a contingent and changing divine will or giving us a divine 
being that exists and changes in time.46 Appealing to the formal distinction 
45The complexities of discussing these omniproperties, much less proving their necessary 
co-instantiation can be seen through examining the recent literature e.g., Rogers, Perfect Being 
Theology; Nagasawa, “A New Defence of Anselmian Theism” and “Models of Anselmian 
Theism”; Oppy, “Perfection, Near-Perfection, Maximality, and Anselmian Theism”; Bohn, 
“Anselmian Theism and Indefinitely Extensible Perfection”; Todd, “The Greatest Possible 
Being Needn’t Be Anything Impossible.”
46E.g., Mullins, “Simply Impossible”; though Steele and Williams “Complexity with-
out Composition,” section 3, shows the relevance of Scotus’s denial of simplicity to his 
voluntarist ethics.
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may be the best option for a complex theist to metaphysically differenti-
ate their position from pantheism, as it requires a level of unity and ase-
ity that a pantheist cosmos may not be able to meet, while still falling 
short of absolute simplicity. Nevertheless, this metaphysical option does 
not seem open to most contemporary advocates of complex theism, given 
their other metaphysical and theological commitments. Versions of com-
plex theism that do not go the Scotist route will remain on a metaphysical 
par with pantheism.
11. Conclusion
While pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the 
unity of the cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts, we have 
seen that pantheists have a powerful challenge for their theist critics: either 
give a satisfactory account of divine simplicity or accept that theism and 
pantheism are in the same sort of metaphysical position when it comes to 
explanatory and ontological priority. Current proposals for the metaphys-
ics of complex theism do not offer any greater unity or ontological inde-
pendence than pantheism, since they are modeled on priority monism. The 
best option for the complex theist may be reviving the formal distinction of 
Duns Scotus, but this requires considerable further metaphysical defense 
and may not be a live option for many complex theists, given their other 
commitments. To complex theist critiques of the unity and independence 
of the pantheist cosmos, pantheists can justly respond: tu quoque.
Only classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better off with 
respect to aseity and unity than pantheists, since an absolutely simple first 
principle does not depend in any way on the being of something else and, 
having no parts, is in need of no explanation of its unity. If we endorse ase-
ity and unity as constraints on ultimacy, we are pushed to acknowledge 
that the ultimate is entirely simple. Perhaps only proponents of divine 
simplicity can properly claim to have discovered and acknowledged a 
fully independent ultimate being.47
Metropolitan State University of Denver
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